In his work titled “The Philosophy of History,” Hegel introduced the concept of “the end of history.”
Hegel contends that historical progression should be seen as logically proceeding toward an ever-increasing degree of human autonomy. The recognition of the human superiority of autocrats in the process of conquering other people and turning them into slaves was gradually replaced by the mutual recognition of both groups dialectically as human beings with dignity. This occurred over the course of a lengthy process of historical evolution. The elimination of the adversarial dual-class structure in human society results in an expansion of individual liberties and an improvement in the cohesiveness of society. In Germany, history came to an end during Hegel’s lifetime when seen from a political perspective. Marx, who was influenced by Hegel but more concerned with output, had a distinct interpretation of how history will finish. In Marx’s view, communism would inevitably emerge as the dominant political and economic system of the world due to communism’s far greater rate of production compared to capitalism. The contemporary interpretation of the end of history may be traced back to Fukuyama. Fukuyama’s perspective of history as a political form coming to an end in the United States or the West at the beginning of the 1990s is expressed in the book that bears his name and is titled The End of History and the Last Man. The conclusion reached by Fukuyama is supported in part by Hegel’s theory of recognition and in part by the evidence provided by the fall of the political regimes that existed in the formerly communist nations located in Eastern Europe.
According to Hegel, the period of history known as history as a political or social form in Germany comes to an end at the stage of early capitalism with restricted suffrage. Further,
Fukuyama considers democracy to be the last stage of human history since it is the only political system that incorporates both contestation and inclusion. Marx, on the other hand, considers communism to be the conclusion of history. It should go without saying that neither the abolition of class warfare nor the mutual appreciation of one another’s contributions are sufficient to validate the idea. Second, each of the three of them draws their own conclusions as if the outcomes were predetermined. People in today’s world no longer believe that early capitalism with restricted suffrage as a political system during Hegel’s time was the last stage in the progression of history. Marx, being Marx, arrives to a different conclusion naturally. The inevitability of communism is the crux of the issue with Marx’s theory. The concept of communism is one of utopia. Most importantly, there is no guarantee that communism will replace capitalism as the dominant economic system in the course of history. It is not clear how successful communist societies would be when they transition from the system of private property found in capitalist societies to the system of public ownership of the means of production found in communist societies. It is also not clear why communist societies would be successful. The data that has been gathered up to this point does not give any support for the idea that centrally planned economies and public ownership of the means of production are preferable. Contestation and inclusiveness are two characteristics that, according to Fukuyama, must be present in the political form that will prevail after the end of history. According to Fukuyama, the political system that prevailed in the West and the United States at the turn of the 20th century marks the end of history. However, neither scientific inquiry nor philosophical speculation can provide a guarantee of such a result. Finally, each of the three authors arrives at their distinct conclusions based on just a portion of the data presented. Each is constrained by the facts and knowledge available during his historical period. The nature of future technologies and/or organizations, which will have large influence on information collecting and the decrease of the transaction costs of creating alternative political regimes, is not taken into serious account by any of them.
I have argued in other places that the factors that determine economic and human development in Japan, Singapore,
and China are open access in the economic sphere, institutional building related to the protection of property rights and contract enforcement, financial market, rule of law, and accumulation of human resources. I have also suggested that Britain and China grew similarly following the Glorious Revolution in Britain in 1688 and the Open-Door Policy in China from 1978, respectively, along the aforementioned route of growth. This path of development can be found here. The coordination of their respective elites is the primary distinction between Britain and China. In Britain, the coordination of the elite via Parliament played a crucial part in the process of moving toward free access in the economic sector and in the establishment of new institutions. This role was vital. On the other hand, elite coordination inside the Chinese Communist Party played an essential role in reconfiguring free access in the economic sector and in the creation of institutions. Even if my theory is true, there is no way to predict or guess on what the conclusion of history as a political form may be at this moment since there is no way to know what it might be. On the other hand, my framework is more likely to lead to the conclusion that there are multiple equilibriums in terms of political regimes in establishing open access in the economic sphere and in institutional building to support open access in the economic sphere. This is because it is more likely to lead to the conclusion that there are multiple equilibriums in terms of political regimes in establishing open access in the economic sphere.